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This paper presents new evidence on research and teaching productivity in universities.  The 
findings are based on a panel that covers 1981-1999 and includes 102 top U.S. universities.  
Faculty size grows at 0.6 percent per year, compared with growth of 4.9 percent in the industrial 
science and engineering workforce.  Measured by papers and citations per researcher, 
productivity grows at 1.4-6.7 percent per year and productivity and its rate of growth are higher 
in private than public universities.  Measured by baccalaureate and graduate degrees per teacher, 
teaching productivity grows at 0.8-1.1 percent per year and growth is faster in public than private 
universities.   
A decomposition analysis shows that growth in research productivity within universities 
exceeds overall growth.  This is because research shares grow more rapidly in universities whose 
productivity grows less rapidly.  Likewise the research share of public universities increases even 
though productivity grows less rapidly in public universities.  Together these findings suggest 
that allocative efficiency of U.S. higher education declined during the late 20
th century. 
Regression analysis of individual universities finds that R&D stock, endowment, and post-
doctoral students increase research productivity, that the effect of nonfederal R&D stock is less, 
and that research is subject to decreasing returns.  Since the nonfederal R&D share grows and is 
much higher in public universities, this could account for some of the rising allocative 
inefficiency.  The evidence for decreasing returns in research, which are greater than in teaching, 
suggests limits on the ability of more efficient institutions to expand and implies that differences 
in the scale of the teaching function are the primary reason for differences in university size. 
Besides all this the data strongly hint at growing financial pressures on U.S. public universities.   
I.  Introduction 
 
This paper presents new evidence on the productivity of U.S. universities.   Our interest in 
this subject originates with recent developments in U.S. higher education that strike us as 
noteworthy, possibly even disturbing.  First, despite their high state, growth of employment and 
output in top U.S. research universities has slowed in recent years
1.  And second, growth of 
university research has not kept pace with that of industrial research.  This appearance of strain is 
linked to changes in funding, in which the federal share of university R&D has declined over 
time.  Given the trends and the reliance that firms place on universities, an analysis seems 
warranted to see whether the slowdown reflects a fundamental decline in university prospects. 
We find that research productivity grows at a healthy rate but the allocation of R&D has grown 
less efficient over time.  While this has interfered with aggregate productivity growth, increasing 
budget stringency, especially in public universities, may be the root cause.   
The empirical analysis is based on a panel of 102 top U.S. universities, 68 of which are 
public and 34 private, whose outputs and inputs we observe during 1981-1999.  A key feature of 
our analysis is its separation of productivity into research and teaching, with most of our 
emphasis placed on research, owing to data availability.  The approach assumes that research and 
teaching activities are on the whole separable.  In one sense, though, our approach makes a virtue 
out of necessity.  Price index numbers for research and teaching that could combine the two into 
a single index are missing for higher education
2. 
                                                 
1 Data on the top 200 universities world-wide in The Times Higher Education Supplement suggest first, the 
preeminence of U.S. universities; and second, erosion of this preeminence.  Fifty U.S. schools are in the top 200.  
Where a lower rank is better, the mean for 27 U.S. privates is 67.7 in 2004 and 60.7 in 2005; for 23 publics the rank 
is 72.5 in 2004 and 94.8 in 2005; the mean U.S. rank falls from 69.9 to 76.4.  Shanghai Jiao Tong University ranks 
100 schools worldwide in 2003-2005.  In 2003 58 U.S. universities are in the top 100, while 53 appear in 2005.  The 
rankings of U.S. universities improve, but since several publics drop out, it is not clear what to make of this.  Both 
rankings are controversial.  The Times uses employer evaluations while the Shanghai ranking uses a weighted 
average of objective data on prizes, papers, citations, and the like.  I thank Amanda Goodall for these references.     
2 In the future, the R&D satellite accounts at the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis could fill this gap.   
 The definition of productivity is output per faculty-equivalent in research and teaching.  
Research output is papers and citations; teaching output consists of undergraduate and graduate 
degrees; and numbers of faculty are divided into researchers and teachers.  Armed with these 
measures we begin the empirical work with a description of research and teaching productivity. 
Next we decompose productivity growth into sources within and between universities, and also 
groups of public and private universities.  Finally, using regression analysis we examine the 
determinants of productivity in individual universities. 
Beginning with trends we find that numbers of faculty grow at 0.6 percent per year.  This is 
demonstrably low compared with the growth of scientists and engineers in U.S. industry.  In all 
universities during 1981-1999 full-time faculty grow at 1.5 percent a year, while all faculty grow 
at two percent (National Science Board 2004, volume 2, table 5-17).  By comparison growth in 
the industrial science and engineering workforce is 4.9 percent a year during 1980-2000 
(National Science Board 2004, volume 1, chapter 3).  The university sector is clearly a less 
important employer of U.S. scientists and engineers than it was in 1981. 
We find besides that researchers increase more rapidly than teachers. By our reckoning 
researchers grow at 1.4 per cent a year while teachers grow at 0.3 percent.    At the same time 
papers per researcher grow at 1.4 percent and citations to these papers grow at 6.7 percent. 
Research productivity is clearly rising.  A cautionary note is that growth in citations and real 
research growth are not necessarily the same, given the falling cost of citations and worldwide 
growth in the number of citing researchers
3. 
Research productivity in private universities is roughly twice that of public universities. The 
growth rate of research productivity is also greater in private universities, where papers and 
citations grow at 2.2 and 8.6 percent per year, than in public universities, where growth is 
                                                 
3 See the remarks of Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg in Ch. 13 of Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2002). 
  2respectively 1.2 and 6.2 percent.  The growth rate of research productivity is therefore two-thirds 
to one third higher in private universities.     
Findings on teaching productivity are as follows.  The 102 universities produce 4.5 
undergraduate degrees per teacher and 2.6 graduate degrees.  Undergraduate degrees are 50 
percent lower per teacher in private universities, but then graduate degrees per teacher are 50 
percent higher in these universities.  So relative productivity in the two sets of institutions is 
roughly equal.  Over time, however, teaching productivity drops slightly in private universities, 
while it increases at one percent a year in public schools
4.  These quantity indexes do not capture 
changes in the value of higher education, nor do they capture changes in quality, but they 
represent a start on the problem of measuring teaching productivity. 
Besides the study of trends we examine sources of growth in aggregate productivity.  By this 
we mean a shift-share analysis that decomposes aggregate growth into growth within 
universities, growth between universities, and the covariance of growth in shares and 
productivity growth.  Findings from the decomposition are these.  Across all universities the 
within-university component of growth accounts for more than 100 percent of growth in research 
output.  The between-university contribution is smaller but remains positive.  But the covariance 
of growth in research shares with growth in research productivity is negative.  This implies that 
research shares grow faster in universities where productivity growth is slower. 
The decomposition yields similar results within groups of private and public universities.  
The covariance term is always negative and research grows faster in universities where research 
productivity grows more slowly.  This result suggests growing allocative inefficiency in research 
in higher education.  Analysis of sources of growth in teaching productivity tells a similar story.  
                                                 
4 The comparison between top 10 research universities and non-top 10 schools is similar. 
  3More than 100 percent of growth is accounted for by the within component, the between 
component is small but positive, and the covariance term is strictly negative.       
Regression analysis of research and teaching productivity concludes the empirical work.   We 
find that R&D, endowment, and post-doctoral students increase research productivity but that 
research is subject to decreasing returns.  In public universities (but not private) there is evidence 
that graduate students contribute to research productivity.  The nonfederal R&D stock in a 
university is linked to a decline in research productivity.  This result disappears when fixed 
effects are included so that we are unable to identify a within-university effect of nonfederal 
R&D.  One interpretation is that nonfederal funds are subject to earmarking and are awarded 
under less stringent competitive conditions.  Another is that the goal of nonfederal funds is less 
to produce research than it is to produce information.  Regardless of the interpretation, the share 
of nonfederal funds in university R&D stocks grows by 19 percent over the sample period.  
Overall, it comprises 40 percent of funding in the publics versus 20 percent in the privates. It 
could be a factor in productivity differences among public and private universities.      
Regression analysis finds that undergraduate teaching productivity increases with enrollment, 
and (in public universities) with graduate assistants.  In public universities state appropriations 
are linked to a decline in undergraduate degrees per teacher.  Production is not subject to 
decreasing returns to the same degree as research, suggesting that variation in university size is 
primarily a matter of teaching and not research.  
Graduate teaching productivity increases with graduate students and R&D.  However, the 
output of graduate degrees decreases with the nonfederal share of R&D, suggesting that unlike 
federal R&D nonfederal funds are not for the support of graduate students.  Reassuringly, 
graduate students are at least as important in their own education as they are in faculty research.        
  4The rest of the paper consists of five sections.  Section II describes productivity measurement 
and presents identities that decompose productivity growth into within, between, and covariance 
components. In addition the section specifies productivity regressions.  Section III discusses the 
database and presents descriptive statistics.  Section IV carries out the decomposition analysis of 
productivity growth.  Regression findings are presented in Section V.  Section VI is a discussion 
and conclusion, with emphasis on the challenges facing public universities in the U.S.  
II.  Analytical Framework   
A. Productivity Definitions     
The productivity index that we use in this paper is output per faculty member
5.  But 
university faculty produce both research and teaching.  Can labor productivity be measured 
separately for the two outputs?   Our best but also very imperfect answer is yes.  We can exploit 
expenditure shares on research and teaching to construct estimates of research and teaching 
faculty-equivalents and labor productivity in research and teaching.  This of course assumes that 
these outputs are separable production processes.  While the assumption seems reasonable for 
research and undergraduate teaching, it is less promising for research and graduate education. To 
an unknown extent these are jointly produced but for practical reasons we set this complication 
to one side.  First, undergraduate teaching dominates most universities and this conforms to the 
assumption of separability.  Second, statistics of teaching expenditures by universities do not 
distinguish undergraduate and graduate students.  Estimated teaching faculty exceeds the number 
of undergraduate teachers.  The result is a downward bias in undergraduate teaching 
productivity.  Third, the proportion of graduate teaching in all teaching is higher in universities 
of the first rank.  Omitting graduate teaching would bias teaching productivity comparisons 
                                                 
5 We rely on labor productivity for the usual reason in productivity studies, that we lack data on physical capital 
stocks which would give us indices of total factor productivity. 
  5between schools.  A related reason for including graduate students is that top U.S. research 
universities have increasingly emphasized graduate teaching.  Omitting graduate education 
would under-estimate the growth of teaching productivity.  So while research and graduate 
education have joint production aspects, there are reasons for treating the two as separable. 
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B. Decomposition of Productivity Growth    
Section IV uses a shift-share analysis to decompose research and teaching productivity 
growth into within, between, and covariance components
6.  We apply this decomposition to the 
explanation of productivity growth in universities and groups of public and private universities.  
To simplify notation we drop subscript I R j , =  and let LP  stand for either research or 
teaching.  Also let  represent be weighted average of productivity across universities and let 
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After some algebra, which is shown in Part A. of the Appendix, we reach 
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The change in aggregate productivity consists of three terms.  The first is the sum of changes in 
productivity within universities weighted by their share in output.  This is the within-university 
                                                 
6 See for example, Foster, Krizan, and Haltiwanger (2001). 
  6component.  The second is the covariance of changes in shares with changes in productivity.  It 
answers the question: is growth in share positively or negatively associated with productivity 
growth? The third term is the between-university component.  It is the sum of changes in shares 
times the difference between individual and average productivity.  This captures whether more 
efficient universities on average gain or lose share. 
Equation (2) applies to individual universities, but we are interested besides in groups of 
private and public universities.  Part B. of the Appendix shows that 
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The first term is the within-group component. It is the average across the two groups of growth 
in productivity within each group using within-group average productivity growth.  The second 
is the covariance component: growth in group A’s share times the gap between growth in its 
productivity and group B’s.  The third term is the between-group component: the increase in 
group A’s share times the difference in its initial productivity and that of group B.  We use (2) 
and (3) to decompose productivity growth in higher education in Section IV. 
C. Productivity Regressions 
  Section V undertakes regression analysis of labor productivity. For this purpose, as noted, 
productivity is derived from separable production functions for research and teaching. We 
assume that labor productivity in research takes an almost Cobb-Douglas form: 
(4)    
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  7The term  captures productivity-augmenting features of universities Rit A
7.  We decompose R&D 
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8  Also included in (4) are time trend  and , the error term in research 
productivity.  Besides
t Rit u
R δ , the parameters include R α , the output elasticity of labor; R β , the output 
elasticity of R&D stock; and R γ , the coefficient of time trend.  
One determinant of  is the dummy indicator of public or private control .  This 
affects productivity through governance and selectivity.  Endowment  is used to hire star 
faculty and buy back time, so we expect it to increase productivity. And both post-doctoral and 
graduate students   and  could augment faculty time.  Research labor-augmentation 
follows the constant-elasticity function, 
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Inserting this into (4), rearranging, and taking logarithms we reach the nonlinear regression 
(5)   []
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Section V reports estimates of (5).  When constant returns to scale hold the coefficient on the 
logarithm of  vanishes.  Otherwise its sign captures the direction of divergence from constant  Rit L
                                                 
7 The (almost) Cobb-Douglas assumption means that Hicks-neutral shifts cannot be distinguished from factor 
augmentation.  For convenience we treat all shifts as labor augmenting. 
8 This functional form allows a direct comparison between the effects of a dollar of non-federal and federal R&D 
stock.  As far as we are aware, use of this device appears first in Griliches (1986), who used it to distinguish the 
effects of basic and applied research on firm productivity.  
  8returns
9.  Notice that we lag  on the right by one year to limit division error bias.    Rit L
  Teaching productivity can be similarly modeled.  Assuming a Cobb-Douglas production 
function for baccalaureate and graduate degrees, we obtain the following specification for 
teaching productivity 
(6)    
Iit I I I I






Iit Iit Iit e S L A
L





γ β α α
γ β α
1 ) (
/.   
Labor augmentation  depends on teaching skill and other aspects of teaching.  Included are 
enrollments or stocks of students in residence ; time trend ; and , the error term in teaching 
productivity.  Parameters are
Iit A
it S t Iit u
I α , the output elasticity of labor,  I β , the output elasticity of R&D 
stock, and I γ , the coefficient of time trend.   
Determinants of instructional labor-augmentation  again include public or private 
control . A second determinant, in public universities, is state teaching appropriations per 
teacher .  This could be destined for the reduction of class size.  If so we expect it to reduce 
degrees per teacher. Alternatively, state appropriations could alter the composition of education 
in favor of graduate education.  But in addition  could increase the quality of education. And 
third, graduate students  per teacher could substitute for faculty in undergraduate teaching.  
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9 Adams and Griliches (1998) regress the logarithm of research output on the logarithm of R&D stock. They find 
that the specification exhibited diminishing returns at the university-field level and constant returns at the field level.  
But they did not examine labor productivity, because the data were not available.   
  9(7)  
Iit Iit I IG IT I Iit it I Iit it IG I
Iit it IT I i IC I I I I Iit Iit
u L L S L G
L T C t B L Q
+ − + + + + +
+ + + + =
− − −
−
) ln( ) 1 ) 1 ( [ ) / ln(   ) / ln(      
) / ln( ) ln(   ) /   ln(   
1 1 1
1
β η η α β η α
η α η α γ α
 
We also include the logarithm of R&D stock in some of the graduate student equations, using the 




Rit I I Rit I K K K + = δ β β     ln ln , as in (4).  Section IV reports estimates 
of (7).  If constant returns holds the coefficient on  disappears; otherwise its sign captures the 
divergence from constant returns.  As before, we lag  to limit division error bias. 
Iit L
Iit L
III.  Description of the Data     
A.  Database of Universities 
This study is based on 110 universities that account for most academic research in the 
United States.  The primary data sources that we use are the Institute for Scientific Information 
(ISI) for research outputs, the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) data 
from the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) for finances, faculty, salaries, and 
degrees; and the National Science Foundation (NSF) CASPAR database for academic R&D and 
graduate students.  Since data are missing for eight universities this study examines 102 schools.  
Allowing for lags we observe universities during 1982-1999.  Thus, before missing values are 
removed, the data form a panel of 1,836 observations (18 years times 102 universities)
10.   
Included in the panel are faculty counts, research and teaching expenditures, research outputs 
consisting of papers and citations, and teaching outputs consisting of baccalaureate and graduate 
degrees.  We use the expenditure data to allocate faculty between research and teaching. These 
data yield labor productivity statistics in research and teaching.  In addition we construct R&D 
stocks, endowment, stocks of graduate students, undergraduate enrollments, and indicators of 
                                                 
10 Since research and teaching faculty are lagged one year on the right of (5) and (7), the 1981 data are excluded 
from the regressions. 
  10public-private control
11.  The rest of this section describes the variables and calculations that we 
have performed using them. 
B.  Faculty Statistics 
The data include estimates of faculty counts by university.  We use tenure track and non-
tenure track faculty counts from the National Center for Education Statistics’ (NCES) Faculty 
Salary Survey, available through the Integrated Postsecondary Education System (IPEDS).  
Figure 1 shows tenure track and non-tenure track faculty over time.  Non-tenure track faculty 
grow at a slightly faster rate than tenure track faculty, but not by enough to change the non-
tenure track share, which remains at nine percent throughout the period
12. 
Since faculty engages in research and teaching and these tend to be competing uses of 
time, we would like to obtain faculty-equivalents in these activities.  If these were mutually 
exclusive production functions for research and teaching would be separable.  This assumption is 
not as reasonable for graduate education, where teaching and research are to an extent jointly 
produced
13.  But as noted in Section II, it is necessary to tolerate some inaccuracy in the 
allocation of faculty to research and teaching.  The data on teaching expenditures do not 
distinguish undergraduates from graduates and removing graduate education as an output biases 
the contributions of different universities. 
                                                 
11 R&D is over-counted because of transfers between universities.  Such transfers should be deducted from the R&D 
of sending universities and added to the R&D of receiving universities.  But this is not the current practice. 
12 National Science Foundation data show that the share of part-time faculty during 1981-1999 rises from 19 percent 
to 28 percent in research universities (National Science Board (2004), Volume 2, Table 5-17).  We studied the use of 
part-time faculty using the biennial NCES Fall Staff Surveys from 1987 to 1997.  Leaving aside graduate assistants 
we find that the 34 privates use a higher proportion of part-time faculty than the 68 publics.  However, the part-time 
proportion grows faster, by 24 percent versus 10 percent.  This suggests that the Salary Survey may understate 
relative faculty growth in public universities.  But the Fall Staff Survey data are rather noisy; and they fail to classify 
graduate assistants by teaching and research function.  The evidence presented in Table 9 below suggests that 
graduate students are an important substitute for faculty in public universities.      
13 Modern graduate education is often credited to the 19
th century chemist Justus von Liebig, who learned how to 
combine graduate teaching with laboratory research.  See the entry on von Liebig in the Encyclopedia Britannica 
and Mokyr (2002).   
  11Thus we employ research and teaching expenditures to separate faculty into research and 
teaching components.  Note that these categories exclude administration, sports, and auxiliary 
enterprises such as food and dormitory services, hospitals, and student organizations.  This seems 
correct since the primary activities of faculty are teaching and research.   Notice also that 
research expenditures  include separately budgeted expenditures that are internal and 
external to the university.  Instructional expenditures  include expenditures for credit and 
non-credit instruction.  This includes all instruction: academic, occupational, vocational, special 
session, community, and remedial and tutorial instruction. Also included are research and public 
service that are not separately budgeted. 
it REXP
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By this account the separation of research and teaching is imperfect.  But as an 
assumption, it is clearly an improvement on perfect multi-tasking.  That assumption argues that 
faculty members simultaneously teach and perform research.  We replace it with a better 
approximation, that the proportion of research faculty equals the proportion of research 
expenditures in both research and teaching expenditures ) /( it it it IEXP REXP REXP + .  Research and 

















In (8)   is total faculty in universityi at timet.    and   are denominators of labor 
productivity in research and teaching in equations (1), (4), and (6).  There is however, a bias in 
this, which suggests that researchers are over-estimated and teachers under-estimated.  Because 
the research skill price exceeds that of teaching, research expenditures buy fewer researchers and 
it L Rit L Iit L
  12teaching expenditures buy more teachers than (9) would suggest. But since we know rather little 
about the research premium we cannot correct this bias
14. 
  Figure 2 charts the course of the expenditure proportion . For all 
universities the curve’s fish-hook shape reflects the decline in research funding from 1981-1983 
and its subsequent recovery and expansion.  But the overall curve conceals differences between 
public and private universities.  In both cases the expenditure share declines through 1983, but 
afterwards the pattern differs.  The research share in private schools recovers to 0.38 in 1988 but 
then declines. This is consistent with reductions in overhead rates for private schools in the late 
1980s (Ehrenberg, 2003). The overall pattern in private universities is one of decline, from 0.41 
in 1981 to 0.36 in 1999.  In contrast, the research share in public universities rises from 0.33 in 
1983 to 0.40 in 1999 and the overall pattern is one of increase.  
) /( it it it IEXP REXP REXP +
  Table 1 reports means and growth rates of faculty, the research expenditure proportion, 
and researchers and teachers.  It does so for all, public, and private universities. Universities 
employ an average of 1,048 faculty.  The research expenditure proportion is 38 percent and an 
estimated 381 faculty are engaged do research while 667 teach.  Public universities employ 1,218 
faculty of which 444 are researchers and 774 teachers. Employment in private schools is 703, of 
which 252 are researchers and 451 teachers.   
Table 1 also presents growth rates.  Researchers grow faster than teachers by 1.4 percent 
a year versus 0.3 percent.  Thus research-intensity of faculty is growing.  Growth of researchers 
is faster in public universities, while growth in teachers is faster in private universities
15.  
                                                 
14 Let   as above, and let ) /( IEXP REXP REXP f + = 0 / ) ( > − = I I R w w w ρ , where =research wage 
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unfortunately the value of ρ  is unknown, including its variation by university. 
  13Figures 3 and 4 are graphs of research and teaching faculty.  To concentrate on 
cumulative growth and facilitate comparison we normalize each time series by its 1981 value. 
Figure 3 shows that research faculty rise by almost 30 percent in the publics but by less than 15 
percent in the privates.  Figure 4 reveal that teachers grow by more than 30 percent in the 
privates but decline slightly in the publics.  For all universities cumulative growth in researchers 
is 25 percent by 1999 (Figure 3) but only five percent for teachers (Figure 4).  This suggests that 
the mix of faculty in top U.S. universities is becoming more research-oriented.  
C. Research and Teaching Outputs    
To calculate labor productivity in research and teaching we require output measures.  We 
treat papers and citations as research outputs, comparable with patent statistics in industry.  The 
articles derive from agriculture, astronomy, biology, chemistry, computer science, earth sciences, 
economics and business, engineering, mathematics and statistics, medicine, physics, and 
psychology.  These fields account for most research carried on in universities.  The universities 
publish 2.4 million papers during 1981-1999 and the papers receive 18.8 million citations.  For 
each paper we calculate the fraction that a given university contributes.  If two schools are listed 
each is assigned half of the paper, if three are listed each is assigned one-third, and so on.  
Citations received are similarly assigned and in this way we limit the problem of multiple 
counting of research output.  The fractions are summed across fields by year to arrive at 
fractional paper-equivalents of a university per year.  Fractional citations are similarly summed, 
and the citations are accumulated over the first five years since publication, yielding a five-year 
window on citations received. This right-truncates the citations.  Also the five-year window cuts 
                                                                                                                                                             
15 Since research expenditures that are not separately budgeted are recorded as instructional expense, the figures for 
instruction may include cross-subsidization of research by teaching. 
  14off citations in 1995, the last year for which a complete record exists.  Despite this the five-year 
window standardizes citations received and provides a quality dimension for research output.    
Baccalaureate and graduate degrees are currently our indicators of teaching output.  At 
the present time we lack a quality indicator such as cost or forward value of a degree
16.  The data 
are taken from NCES-IPEDS degree surveys.    
The upper half of Table 2 reports mean research output consisting of papers and five-year 
citations, and teaching output consisting of baccalaureate and graduate degrees.  As before, we 
report data for all, public, and private universities. Universities publish 1,183 papers per year: the 
papers account for 4,948 citations over their first five years.  Private universities publish slightly 
more total papers and public universities slightly less, but private schools have a decided 
advantage in citations (Adams and Griliches, 1998), which probably signals differences in 
faculty quality as reflected in salary (Ehrenberg, 2003).   
Universities produce 3,010 baccalaureate degrees and 1,747 graduate degrees per year. 
Reflecting their size and specialization in undergraduate education, public universities produce 
3,795 baccalaureate degrees and 1,721 graduate degrees. Private universities produce 1,417 
baccalaureate degrees and 1,758 graduate degrees; they specialize in graduate education. 
D. Labor Productivity in Research and Teaching    
The lower half of Table 2 reports means of productivity by type.  The data show an 85 
percent advantage of private universities in papers (7.4 papers versus 2.6 papers per faculty), and 
an almost 3-to-1 advantage in citations (20.4 citations versus 7.4 citations per researcher)
17.  
                                                 
16 One idea is to use National Association of Colleges and Employers (NACE) data on starting salaries by major, but 
these are not available to academic researchers. 
17 Means weighted by size of research faculty.   Equally weighted means for public and private institutions are 3.8 
and 4.9 papers per researcher, and 17.4 and 25.3 five-year citations per researcher.  We prefer weighted means, 
which give larger universities more weight and offer a clearer picture of overall research productivity.    
  15In Table 2 total degrees per teacher are similar across university type.  Any differences 
show up in undergraduate and graduate productivity
18.  Indeed the total degree gap is small 
considering the concentration of private schools on costly graduate education.  The smaller 
output of undergraduate degrees per faculty in these institutions again indicates their 
specialization in graduate education. 
Figures 5 and 6 are graphs of research productivity over time.  Again the series are 
normalized by 1981 values.  All the series on papers per researcher in Figure 5 grow through 
1995 and flatten afterwards.  Private universities grow faster, with the divergence taking place 
during 1981-1995.  By 1999 papers per research faculty grow by 20 percent in public universities 
but by 40 percent in public universities.  Figure 6 reports citations received per faculty.  The data 
series end in 1995 given the five-year window on citations. Again a gap opens up between 
privates and publics during 1981-1995.  By 1995 citations per researcher in public universities 
grow by 80 per cent but by 220 percent in private universities.   
  Table 3 provides more evidence on the increasing productivity gap between public and 
private universities.  Annual growth in papers is 1.4 percent in all institutions and growth in 
citations is 6.7 percent.  Comparable figures in public universities are 1.2 percent (papers) and 
6.2 percent (citations).   Productivity growth in private universities equals 2.2 percent (papers) 
and 8.6 percent (citations). 
  The bottom half of the table shows growth in teaching productivity in all universities of 
about one percent a year.  The data show a decline in teaching productivity in private universities 
                                                 
18 Since the data do not allow us to distinguish undergraduate teachers from graduate teachers, we are double-
counting teachers in computing teaching productivity.  Thus, it is not all clear that fewer undergraduate degrees are 
produced per undergraduate teacher in private schools, or that fewer graduate degrees are produced per graduate 
teacher in public schools.  
  16of -0.6 to -0.1 percent, compared with a rise of 1.2 to 1.4 percent in public universities.  But 
again these measurements lack a quality dimension. 
  Trends in baccalaureate and graduate degrees per teacher are shown in Figures 7 and 8.  
The figures show that all the growth in teaching productivity occurs in public universities. 
Comparing these with Figures 6 and 7 we see that as measured, productivity growth is faster in 
research than teaching.  
E. Other Data 
We collected several other variables, including faculty salary, academic R&D stocks, 
endowment, and state teaching appropriations, all expressed in thousands of 1992 dollars.  In 
addition we collected lagged stocks of graduate students from the NSF-CASPAR database.  
Table 4 reports means of faculty compensation, consisting of wages plus fringe benefits, 
by faculty rank and university type.  Mean compensation averages 65 thousand dollars of 1992.  
Compensation is higher in private universities, especially at the full professor level, so that the 
wage trajectory is much steeper in these universities.  Figure 9 shows that compensation also 
rises at a faster rate in private universities.  Both patterns are familiar, but what is not as well 
known is how closely the public-private wage differential tracks the differential in public-private 
research productivity (but not teaching productivity). This advantage of private universities is of 
course related to their financial resources.   
Past R&D funding contributes to current research output and it also indicates research 
excellence.  For both reasons it is correlated with research productivity.   R&D stock is the 
lagged stock of research funding received over the previous eight years, depreciated at 15 
percent per year, and expressed in thousands of 1992 dollars.  R&D pertains to the same fields of 
  17science and schools that yield the research output statistics
19.  The source of the R&D data is the 
NSF-CASPAR database. 
We divide the R&D stock into federal and nonfederal components.  This is a likely factor 
in research productivity because nonfederal money could be less subject to competitive pressures 
than federal grants and because it may consist of contracts that provide information and advice 
rather than publications
20.  Figure 10 show that nonfederal R&D contributes 20 percent of the 
private university stock but 40 percent of the public university stock. The share of nonfederal 
R&D grows relative to the federal stock and is 19 percent higher by 1999. 
Endowment is used to attract highly skilled faculty and to support research. For both 
reasons, endowment per faculty should increase research productivity.  Endowment could also 
reduce size of classes or support students, although we fail to find evidence for this.  State 
appropriations could reduce class size and degrees per faculty member but they could also 
expand graduate programs.  These data derive from NCES-IPEDS surveys. 
The lagged stock of graduate students helps to produce research and undergraduate 
teaching. It should increase research and teaching productivity, but besides this it is an output 
(Adams and Griliches, 1998).  The graduate student data are drawn from the NSF-CASPAR 
database for the 12 sciences in this study.  Also taken from this source is the stock of post-
doctoral students, another input into research. 
 
 
                                                 
19 The 12 fields are agriculture, astronomy, biology, chemistry, computer science, earth  sciences, economics and 
business, engineering, mathematics and statistics, medicine, physics, and psychology. 
20 It is for this reason that we think that recent findings (De Figueiredo and Silverman, 2002) that 5-6 percent of 
federal R&D dollars are earmarked and a source of inefficiency represent an understatement of the problem.  We 
agree that the federal question is interesting, but we also believe that replacement of federal funds by nonfederal 
funds may be the larger issue.  
  18IV.  Decomposition of Aggregate Productivity Growth 
Following equation (2), Table 5 reports decompositions of aggregate productivity growth in 
research and teaching.  The table contains three panels corresponding to all, public, and private 
universities.  The top line of each panel reports aggregate productivity growth.  This is arithmetic 
rather than percentage growth.  It is the sum of the change in productivity over all universities in 
a given set.  By (2) the within-university, covariance, and between-university components sum to 
the total except for rounding error. The shares of each component in aggregate productivity 
growth are shown in parentheses.  
The within-university component dominates.  It is usually positive: the exception is a small 
decline in teaching productivity within private universities.  The covariance term is always 
negative: this implies that output share grows more rapidly in universities where productivity 
grows more slowly.  The between-university component is usually positive: output shares grow 
in universities whose productivity is above average.  One exception to this is a slight decline in 
the between-university component of citations.   
We would like to compare Table 5 with decompositions for the private sector.  Foster, 
Haltiwanger and Krizan (2001) offers the closest comparison.  In their findings for industry the 
within-establishment component is a much smaller share of productivity growth
21.  This is partly 
because net entry contributes to industry growth.  Entry is identically zero for top universities but 
besides this, the covariance term is positive in industry and negative in higher education. In 
summary while entry and between-establishment reallocation increase private sector growth, 
they are either not a factor (entry) or they decrease growth in universities (covariance).         
Table 6 studies growth in groups of public and private universities.  The decomposition 
follows (3).  Within-group productivity growth is positive but the covariance and between-group 
                                                 
21 See Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan (2001), P. 322, Table 8.4, line 2. 
  19terms are negative in seven out of eight cases.  The results imply that the share in research and 
teaching rises faster for the group whose productivity grows more slowly (covariance 
component), and that the share grows faster for the group whose productivity is less (between-
group component).  In research it is the less efficient group of public universities whose share 
increases, while in teaching it is the apparently less efficient group of private universities. 
V.  Regression Findings   
The empirical work concludes with regression analysis of research and teaching productivity.  
Tables 7 and 8 contain findings on research productivity in public and private universities. The 
dependent variable in 7.1-7.3 is the logarithm of papers per research faculty.  The dependent 
variable in 7.4-7.6 is the logarithm of five-year citations to the papers per research faculty.  
Equations 7.3 and 7.6 include university fixed effects while the rest exclude these effects. 
Consider papers per researcher in public universities.   The coefficient of time trend is 
negative and significant in 7.1 and 7.2 but is positive and significant in 7.3.  This is consistent 
with the shift of research towards less productive universities. Table 5 has shown that as a result, 
within-university growth accounts for more than 100 percent of growth.   This negative 
“between” effect is included in 7.1 and 7.2 but is omitted from the “within” regression 7.3. 
Besides trend, the table includes the logarithm of R&D stock per researcher, and it also 
includes the logarithm of lagged researchers, as a check on returns to scale.  The nonfederal 
coefficient is significantly less than that of federal R&D and it approximates zero in the citation 
regressions
22.  The R&D elasticity is always positive.  The coefficient of lagged researchers is 
negative, suggesting decreasing returns to scale throughout. 
                                                 
22 The negative sign on nonfederal R&D does not hit a boundary because nonfederal funds are small. 
  20Equation 7.2 adds endowment, graduate students, and post-doctoral students to 7.1
23. The 
effect of R&D stock declines but remains positive and significant. Since R&D stock supports   
graduate and post-doctoral students, part of its effect is mediated by these variables, which are 
accordingly positive and significant.  In 7.2, endowment has a small positive effect.  The sign 
and significance of lagged researchers again suggests diminishing returns.   
We include fixed effects in the within-university equation 7.3, which is otherwise the same as 
7.2.  The elasticities of the R&D stock, graduate students, and post-doctoral students decline in 
the within-university dimension but remain positive and significant.  Endowment is now 
negative and significant, which is puzzling.   Diminishing returns are stronger than before.    
Equations 7.4-7.6 report citation regressions whose setup follows 7.1-7.3.   Compared to the 
earlier results trend growth is higher but consistent with Table 5 it is still higher in the “within” 
regression 7.6.  The discount of nonfederal R&D is even greater than for papers, but this effect 
disappears in 7.6.  The elasticity of R&D stock is higher than in the papers regressions, which 
suggests that part of R&D’s effect occurs through research quality. Diminishing returns to R&D 
continues to prevail.  The contribution of post-doctoral students (but not graduate students) to 
research productivity remains positive and significant once fixed effects are included.  
Table 8 reports similar results for private universities.  Equations 8.1-8.2 and 8.4-8.5 are the 
“total” specifications for papers and citations. As in Table 7 the coefficient of time trend reverses 
sign when fixed effects are included in 8.3 and 8.6.  When fixed effects are included, as in 8.3 
and 8.6, the elasticity of the R&D stock declines but this coefficient remains significant.   The 
estimate of the nonfederal coefficient is imprecise: in the papers equations 8.1 and 8.3 it is 
significantly less than 1.0, but in 8.2 this difference is not significant. The nonfederal effect is 
significantly less than zero in 8.4 and 8.5 but does not differ from 1.0 in the “within” equation 
                                                 
23 To be more precise, graduate and post-doctoral students are averages of stocks over the previous three years.   
  218.6.  Overall, as in Table 7, the nonfederal R&D coefficient is less than or equal to that of federal 
R&D.  Endowment is consistently stronger in Table 8, implying that private universities are 
adept at harnessing endowment to raise their research productivity. The coefficient of post-
doctoral students increases but the graduate student coefficient decreases compared with Table 7.  
Thus private universities rely more on post-doctoral students to produce their research.               
Finally we turn to Tables 9 and 10, which contain regression findings for teaching 
productivity.  The dependent variable in 9.1-9.3 and 10.1-10.3 is the logarithm of baccalaureate 
degrees per teacher.  In 9.4-9.6 and 10.4-10.6 it is the logarithm of graduate degrees per teacher.   
We begin with undergraduate productivity in public universities.  Equation 9.1 includes time 
trend, the logarithm of undergraduate enrollments per teacher, and following (7) the logarithm of 
teachers, to test for the returns to scale to teaching
24.    Time trend is insignificant.  The logarithm 
of enrollment is positive and significant, and its coefficient is robust in 9.3 to the inclusion of 
fixed effects.  We would expect it to be robust given that students are inputs into their own 
education (Rothschild and White, 1995, Winston, 1999).   The coefficient of teaching faculty is 
positive and significant in 9.1, suggesting increasing returns.  However, when fixed effects are 
included in 9.3 this sign reverses.  Thus, unlike research, where returns are decreasing, the 
evidence on returns to scale is mixed in undergraduate teaching.   
Equation 9.2 includes the logarithms of graduate students, endowment, and state 
appropriations per teacher.  Graduate students play a significant role in public undergraduate 
education but it is perhaps not surprising that endowment has little effect.  State appropriations 
reduce degrees per faculty, but the interpretation of this is unclear.  Equation 9.3 adds fixed 
effects to 9.2.  Enrollment and graduate students remain important determinants of baccalaureate 
degrees within universities, but state appropriations drop out.     
                                                 
24 To be precise, undergraduate enrollment is the average undergraduate enrollment over the previous three years. 
  22The graduate teaching equations conclude Table 9.  Equation 9.4 includes trend, graduate 
students, and lagged teachers.  Trend is positive and significant, graduate students are a key input 
into their own education, and the sign of lagged teachers provides some evidence of diminishing 
returns.  Equation 9.5 adds state appropriations per teacher. These increase output of graduate 
degrees, the opposite of 9.2. Together this suggests that state support substitutes graduate 
students for undergraduates.  Since R&D hones the research skills of graduate students, equation 
9.5 also includes the logarithm of the stock of R&D.  The coefficient of nonfederal stock has a 
negative effect on graduate degrees; this is insignificant in 9.6.  Federal R&D supports graduate 
education while nonfederal R&D does not.  Equation 9.6 adds fixed effects to 9.5.  Coefficients 
of graduate students and R&D stock remain significant, but the signs of endowment, state 
appropriations, and lagged teachers change.  In particular, the evidence on decreasing returns in 
this table is fragile and conflicting.  Along with the evidence on decreasing returns to research it 
suggests that variation in university size is primarily due to teaching.           
Table 10 reports findings for private universities. Main differences from Table 9 are these.  
First, there is evidence for decreasing returns to undergraduate teaching in private universities.  
Second, unlike their role in public universities, graduate students are not a significant input for 
undergraduate education. As before graduate degrees do not increase with nonfederal R&D.         
VI.  Discussion and Conclusion  
This paper finds evidence of growing allocative inefficiency in U.S. higher education.  Our 
most compelling evidence for this claim derives from research output, which is better measured 
than teaching output at this time.  We find that universities whose productivity grows less rapidly 
experience more rapid growth in research share.  The allocation of research between public and 
private universities has also grown less efficient over time.  While the share of public universities 
  23grows more rapidly their research productivity grows more slowly.  On top of this the between-
university component is negative: the public university share grows though their research 
productivity is less. One suspect that might explain this growing inefficiency is nonfederal R&D.  
Its more rapid growth and its much larger role in public universities fit the patterns that we 
observe.  In support of this view, Tables 7 and 8 show that nonfederal R&D stock decreases 
research productivity.  Whether this result is due to less competitive conditions attending 
nonfederal grants or whether nonfederal awards produce less research by intention, we cannot 
say.  According to Tables 7 and 8 private university endowments also contribute to the gap in 
public-private research productivity. 
 Our findings for teaching productivity are similar, but we are less convinced by them.  For 
starters, the quality dimension of instruction is missing.  Falling class size could reflect a rising 
demand for quality due to growth in wealth at the top of the distribution. This indicates that 
families partly control the allocation of students to schools.  Surely this moderates allocative 
inefficiency in teaching. 
A deeper interpretation of the observations might instead point to the financial fortunes of 
public and private universities over the past quarter century.  The public-private comparisons in 
this paper are consistent with rising teaching pressures on public universities that could well 
discourage more productive researchers from applying for positions.  This decline in 
competitiveness might explain the increasing reliance, especially by state universities, on 
nonfederal R&D that appears to detract from research-productivity.  On that interpretation, the 
rising allocative inefficiency of research that we uncover results from funding pressures that 
render state universities less competitive, and drive them to less productive funding sources.   
        This view of the matter implies a stunning reversal of fortune for public universities.  
  24Starting from the Morrill Act of 1862 and the Hatch Act of 1887, state universities offered 
practical education in the agricultural and mechanical arts to support local industry.  For more 
than a century this formula has achieved great successes (Huffman and Evenson, 1993; Adams, 
2002).  But in our own time it appears to have been less successful.  This can perhaps be traced 
to aging of the population and to the rising mobility of students, both of which weaken the appeal 
of state finance of universities.  If this interpretation is correct, then it suggests a different and 
more privatized approach to funding universities that would place greater reliance on parental 
finance of teaching, and federal and private foundation finance of research.  In any event, some 
solution seems urgent if the U.S. is to retain its preeminence in higher education, and 
subsequently in science, technology, and innovation.      
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  27Appendix 
Productivity Decomposition      
 
Section IV uses the shift-share analysis described in Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan 
(2001) to decompose productivity growth into within, between, and covariance components for 
universities.  This section explains the algebra underlying equations (2) and (3) of the text. 
A.  Decomposition among Individual Universities  
Let   represent mean labor productivity across universities,   stand for productivity 
of a university, and   represent the share of a university in total output.  Then   
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To (A.1) we add the term: 
(A.2)       ∑ − ∆
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(A.2) equals zero because LPt-1 can be factored out and the sum of the changes in shares is zero.  
Combining terms in the result yields equation (2) of the text: 
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B. Decomposition among Groups of Universities 
We are also interested in contributions of groups of universities A and B to productivity 
growth.  Let A and B exhaust the set of universities.  Then aggregate labor productivity growth is 
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  28Notice that the   weights do not add to 1.0 within groups.  The following equation rewrites the 
weighted averages of labor productivities in (A.4) in terms of within-group averages: 
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The three new terms in (A.5) are: 
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Factor total output from the denominator of (A.6).  Then multiply and divide by the sum of 
output in each group using the within-group weights (A.7).  As a result we can rewrite (A.5) as 
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The top line of (A.8) is 
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(A.11) is equation (3) of the text. 
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Figure 6-Five-Year Citations per Research Faculty
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Figure 8-Grad. Degrees per Instructional Faculty
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Table 1 
Faculty by Research and Teaching Function, 








  All 
 
Public Private 
Means     
Tenure Track + Non-Tenure Track Faculty  1,048  1,218  703 
Research Expenditure Proportion  0.379  0.381  0.376 
Research Faculty-Equivalents  381  444  252 
Instructional  Faculty-Equivalents  667  774  451 
Annual Percentage Growth Rates     
Tenure Track + Non-Tenure Track Faculty  0.6  0.4  1.4 
Research Expenditure Proportion  0.5  1.0  -0.5 
Research Faculty-Equivalents  1.4  1.6  0.8 
Instructional  Faculty-Equivalents  0.3  -0.1  1.8 
Notes: The universities are 110 top U.S. research universities, less eight schools with incomplete 
data. Means and growth rates of the expenditure proportion are weighted by expenditure.  
 
Table 2 
Research and Teaching Outputs and Productivity, 











Mean Research Output     
Papers  1,183 1,173 1,204 
Five-Year  Citations  4,948 4,170 6,526 
Mean Teaching Output     
Baccalaureate  Degrees  3,010 3,795 1,417 
Graduate  Degrees  1,747 1,741 1,758 
Weighted Mean Research Productivity     
Papers/Research  Faculty  3.1 2.6 4.8 
Five-Year Citations/Research  Faculty  10.3 7.4 20.4 
Weighted Mean Teaching Productivity     
Baccalaureate Degrees/Teaching Faculty  4.5  4.9  3.1 
Graduate Degrees/Teaching Faculty  2.6  2.2  3.9 
Notes:  Means of research and teaching product ity are weighted by faculty size.  iv
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Annual Percent g Productivity, 














ercentage Growth in Research Productivi    
Papers/Research Faculty  1 1
Faculty  6.7 6. 8
P oductivity     
Faculty  0.8  1.2  -0.6 
1.1 1. -0
.4  .2  2.2 
Five-Year Citations/Research    2  .6 
ercentage Growth in Teaching Pr
  Baccalaureate Degrees/Teaching
Graduate Degrees/Teaching Faculty    4  .1 
No r papers and 1981-1995 for citations.  Productivity growth 
rates are weighted by faculty size. All growth rates are in percents per year. 
 
 
Faculty Compensation by Rank, 











  All  ate 
Means     
 
Public Priv




.1  50.0 
Associate Professor  9.3 
.9
8.5  61.2 
87.4  Full Professor   
All Ranks  4.7  2.6  69.5 
Note sation is expressed in thousands of 1 llars a udes f
b
s:   Faculty compen 992 do nd incl ringe 
enefits in addition to wages.   
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Table 5 













(Shares in Total Productivity Growth in Parentheses) 
 
Tea
All Universities (N   =102)       
    Total Productivity Growth  0.701 (1.00)  8.625 (1.0 0.585 (1.00)  .00) 
   W 9.998 (1.16)  0.801 (1.37)  0.512 (1.09) 
   .518 (-0.18)  -0.251 (-0.43)  -0.221 (-0.47) 
   Be 0.229 (0.33)  0.145 (0.0 0.035 (0.06)  0.178 (0.38) 
Public     
T 0.976 (1.00)  0.518 (1.00) 
   W 5.933 (0.9 1.041 (1.07)  0.626 (1.21) 
   Co 58)  -0.589 (-0 -0.189 (-0.19)  -0.145 (-0.28) 
) 
Pri
.00)  -0.064 (1.00) 
 Within University  1.880 (1.23)  22.878 (1.14)  -0.176 (0.46)  0.051 (-0.80) 
 Covariance  -0.514 (-0.34)  -2.582 (-0.13)  -0.190 (0.50)  -0.334 (5.22) 
 Between University  0.168 (0.11)  8 (-0.01)  -0.010 (0.03)  0.219 (-3.42) 
0)   0.470 (1
ithin University  0.846 (1.21) 
 Covariance  -0.374 (-0.53)  -1
tween University  2) 
Universities (N=68)     
otal Productivity Growth  0.509 (1.00)  5.969 (1.00) 
ithin University  0.520 (1.02)  9) 
variance  -0.297 (-0. .10) 
   Between University  0.287 (0.56)  0.625 (0.10)  0.123 (0.13)  0.037 (0.07
vate Universities (N=34)         
otal Productivity Growth  1.534 (1.00)   20.019 (1.00)  -0.377 (1 T
  
  
   -0.27
Notes:  Productivity growth is   the arithmetic difference 
 and not X XT − 2).  The sum of the 




th With nd Betw
Groups of Public and Private Universities 














the difference over 1981-1999.  It is
1 X XT − 1 1 / ) X .  The decomposition follows equation ( (
Aggregate Productivity Grow in a een 
 





All Universities (N=102)         
   Tota 0 (1.00) 
Wit 55 (1.08)  9.339 (1.08)  0.709 (1.21)  0.403 (0.86) 
Covariance  -0.022 (-0.03)  -0.424 (-0.05)  -0.069 (-0.12)  -0.030 (-0.06) 
Between Group  -0.032 (-0.05)  -0.291 (-0.03)  -0.055 (-0.09)  0.097 (0.21) 
l Productivity Growth  0.701 (1.00)  8.625 (1.00)  0.585 (1.00)  0.47
hin Group  0.7
Notes:  Productivity growth is the difference over 1981-1999.  It is the arithmetic difference 
 and not .  The decomposition follows equation (3).  The sum of the 
components may differ slightly from the total because of rounding error. 
1 X XT − 1 1 / ) ( X X XT −
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(t-Statistics in Parentheses) 
 
 
Papers per Research 
 
 
Citations per Research Faculty 
 
Table 7 
Public Universities: NLLS Research Productivity Equations,  
Papers and Citations Per Research Faculty  
Faculty 
 
Variable or Statistic 
7   7.5  
 
































versity Fixed Effects 
 
Yes No  Yes 
rend  6***  -0.015
0.9)  (-7.6






.016***  2  0.056*
4)  (24.5
federal Stock of R&D per 
















tock of R&D per 









Log (E h 
Faculty
*** 50 5 
(-0.6) 










Log (Research Faculty-1) 
 




Number of Universities 
 
68  68 
Number of Observations 
 
831  831 




2 0.6 0.760    .679
7***  0.455
1.4)  (21.7







-1)  (3.3)  (-4.4)  (4.5) 
ch Faculty








st-Doctoral Students   0.138***  0.004    o
(-13.3)  (-15.1)  (-32.4)  (-9.0) 
8 
4***  -
68 68  68  6







25    0.983 
Notes: Dependent variables a  of pa ons p ulty-
  So as to avoid di as, res equiv  the rig
ables are lagged one  res uiv t. **
t the one-tenth o evel  at t level.
re logarithms pers and citati er research fac
equivalent. vision error bi earch faculty- alents used in ht-hand 
side vari  year relative to earch faculty eq alents on the lef * 
Significant a f one per cent l .  **Significant he one per cent   * 
Significant at the five per cent level.   
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Table 8 
Private Universities: NLLS Research Productivity Equations,  
Papers and Citations Per Research Faculty  








apers per Research Faculty  itations per Research Faculty 
 
Variable or Statistic 
 
8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.5 8.6 


































University Fixed Effects No No 
 












Nonfederal Stock of R&D 






















Log (Stock of R&D per







































4 4 475 
 
 
0.318 0.260 0.072 0.499 0.364 0.117 
2
 
























































Number of Universities 34 34 34 34 34 
Number of Observations 475 475 475  75  75 
Root Mean Squared Error
Adjusted R
Notes: Dependent variables are logarithms of papers and citations per research faculty-
equivalent.  So as to avoid division error bias, research faculty-equivalents used in the right-hand 
side variables are lagged one year relative to research faculty equivalents on the left.  
a By
coincidence data on endowments of private universities end in 1995 so that numbers of 
observations on papers and five-year c
 
itations are the same.  *** Significant at the one-tenth of 
one per cent level.  **Significant at the one per cent level. * Significant at the five per cent level.  
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Table 9 
Pub ns,  





Grad. Degrees per Teaching Faculty 
 
lic Universities: OLS and NLLS Teaching Productivity Equatio
ureate and Graduate Degrees Per Teaching F
(t-Statistics in Parentheses) 
 
cc. Degrees per Teaching Fac
 
Variable or Statistic 
 








9.2 9.3 9.4 9.5 9.6













University Fixed Effects 
Tim






F    
   
 
Log (Graduate Students per 
T
   
















































(4.0)  (-3.8) 
-0.001
(-0.8)
og (Undergrad. Enrollment 
er Teaching Faculty-1) 










   
-1







** - ** 0.020
(-3.2)
-1












onfederal Stock of R&D per 






-1 I δ ) 










og (Stock of R&D per 
eaching Faculty-1) ( I β ) 
) 




















Root  Error 











68 68 68 68 68 
(4.9 (-7.8 (-3.8 (0.4 (-7.5
68  ber of Universities 
mber of Observations  886 886 886 886 886 886 
Mean  Squared  0.276 0.240 0.069 0.346 0.320 0.088 
353.5+++ 280.7+++ 409.2+++ 144.3+++  -- 
ed R
2 0.544 0.655 0.971 0.327 0.426 0.9
Notes: Dependent variables are logarithms of undergraduate and graduate degrees per teac
faculty-equivalent.  To avoid division error bias teaching faculty used in the right-hand side 
variables are lagged one year relative to teaching faculty on the left. *** Significant at the one-
tenth of one per cent level.  **Significant at the one per cent level. * Significant at the five per 
hing 
cent level.  +++ F-statistic is significant at the one-tenth of one percent level. 
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Table 10 
Private Universities: OLS and NLLS Teaching Productivity Equations,  
Baccalaureate and Graduate Degrees Per Teaching Faculty  
(t-Statistics in Parentheses) 
 
 
Bacc. Degrees per Teaching Faculty 
 
 
Grad. Degrees per Teaching Faculty 
 
 
Variable or Statistic 
 














































Log (Undergrad. Enrollment 







   
































Nonfederal Stock of R&D per 
Teaching Faculty-1 ( I δ ) 




Log (Stock of R&D per 
Teaching Faculty-1) ( I β ) 










0.217***  -0.359*** 
(-4.0) 
0.228*** 
(5.9)  (6.4) 
-0.282*** 
(-12.6) 
Number of Universities 
 
34 34 34 34 34 34 
Number of Observations 
 
475 475 475 475 475 475 
Root  Mean  Squared  Error  0.262 0.236 0.067 0.462 0.428 0.079 




0.398 0.513 0.960 0.239 0.347 0.978 
Notes: Dependent variables are logarithms of undergraduate and graduate degrees per teaching 
faculty-equivalent.  To avoid division error bias teaching faculty used in the right-hand side 
variables are lagged one year relative to teaching faculty on the left. *** Significant at the one-
tenth of one per cent level.  **Significant at the one per cent level. * Significant at the five per 
cent level.  +++ F-statistic is significant at the one-tenth of one percent level. 
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